prevention is worth almost literally a pound of cure. By one estimate, each dollar spent on disaster preparedness is worth roughly $15 in mitigated future damage. 4 Society nevertheless fails to take due care to avoid or mitigate these losses.
Individuals and governments alike systematically underestimate the risk and magnitude of disasters and underinvest in otherwise cost-justified precautionary measures. 5 Across the landscape of disaster, from putatively "natural" events such as hurricanes to the full range of losses such as rogue trading, fatal medical errors, and industrial accidents at Three Mile Island and Bhopal, systematic underinvestment in prevention, precaution, and preparation gives rise to "accidents waiting to happen.", 6 So strong are these forces that the entire enterprise of risk management devolves quickly from simple matters of risk avoidance and conflict resolution into economically complex and legally contested forms of risk transfer. Among the four basic tools of risk management -avoidance, reduction, retention, and transfer -the greatest amount of complexity lies in arranging the transfer of risk. 7 Intractable legal complexities confound the transfer of risk, whether 387, 396 (2009) (estimating "the total benefit of a dollar of preparedness spending" as "all future reductions in damage," taking care to discount "those benefits ... for the fact that resources invested today in other ways could have yielded their own return and that preparedness investments will depreciate, becoming less effective over time"). Combining Nadiri and Prucha's 5.9% depreciation rate with their own estimate of a 4% annual interest rate, Healy and Malhotra "estimate the NPV [net present value] of $1 of disaster preparedness to be about $15. " Id. to government or to specialized institutions that profit by pooling risks too treacherous or ruinous for others to bear.
In settings characterized by extreme loss, incurred within compressed time frames, governmental intervention is almost certain.
Laws regulating financial preparedness for catastrophes reveal the actuarial suppositions underlying disaster law and policy. This article explores three facets of risk transfer. Part II explores how risk transfer emerges as the preeminent tool for managing risk. Measures sufficient for managing more modest risks break down as the probability of loss plummets but the magnitude of potential loss increases.
The choice to transfer risk (as opposed to avoiding or managing it through mitigation, diversification, or hedging) leaves open the question of whether private insurance markets can handle catastrophic, highly correlated risks. Part III explores one alternative risk transfer mechanism by which insurance companies have sought to deepen their financial reserves in anticipation of correlated risks. Correlation among risks, the primary obstacle to functional insurance markets for catastrophic coverage, emerges in new form as the motivation for catastrophe bonds -and as these instruments' leading pitfall.
Upon part III's conclusion that catastrophe bonds have not perfected private insurers' financial preparedness for disaster (and may never occupy more than a modest niche within the market for risk transfer), part IV explores constraints on public intervention into disaster insurance. Along the dimensions of space, time, and human behavior, policies compensating individuals for disaster-related losses elude justification on any coherent economic basis. The political economy of public intervention in disaster finance virtually guarantees catastrophic legal responses to catastrophic risks. 8 
II. CORRELATION, COVERAGE, AND CATASTROPHE
Disaster law consists of "assembling the best portfolio of legal rules to deal with catastrophic risks -a portfolio that includes prevention, emergency response, compensation and insurance, and rebuilding strategies." 9 Certain components of this portfolio seek the optimal balance between spreading risk ex ante and compensating victims of disaster ex post. Financial preparedness for catastrophe takes myriad forms, from case-by-case compensation through tort law to hybrid systems of private and public insurance. 1 0 The diverse aspects of disaster law addressing the traditional domain of insurance and finance span a complete remedial spectrum, from compensation through tort actions to alternative risk transfer and public disaster relief through ex ante insurance or ex post compensation.
11
Law typically frames the goal of reallocating and redistributing wealth after disaster as that of compensating victims for their losses. From an economic perspective, disaster law should prepare society to avoid future losses by providing proper incentives to private parties to take due care, by bolstering the resilience of vulnerable communities, and by expanding social capacity to respond to disaster.
12 At its best, "disaster law should deploy its portfolio of tools for compensation and risk-spreading in pursuit of two related but distinct goals: risk management through avoidance of loss and reduction of hazard, plus affirmative investments in human capital and social preparedness. 13 Disaster law presumably begins with the option of taking no action.14 Whatever losses arise from a particular event, the law could offer no recourse, leaving individuals to absorb their losses or, at best, to allocate them according to privately contracted arrangements. Beyond this threadbare baseline, the law may compensate disaster victims through the ordinary tort system. To the extent that victims can identify individual and corporate defendants who have breached some duty of care, tort law provides a case-by-case, pay-as-you-go system of compensation. Certain statutory schemes tailor recovery according to particular types of disaster. For example, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, "each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages ... that result from such incident." 15 Compensation through tort suits, by whatever specific legal mechanism, leaves much to be desired economically. The tort system's inefficiency, estimated to be as high as 50 percent, undermines its effectiveness in deterring negligence, compensating victims, and spreading risk. 16 From a strictly economic view of efficiency, "catastrophic losses, almost by definition, would seem poor candidates for deterrence through" a tort-based "liability system." 17 Local, state, and federal governments may also face lawsuits. Despite the proliferation of statutes immunizing governments against liability for negligent disaster management," individuals may, under certain conditions, sue the public operators of large-scale public infrastructure that fails during times of disaster. Indeed, it is not too far-fetched to assert that disaster law begins at the precise point where risk may be expected to transcend the managerial capacity of any individual party. The probability of loss, multiplied by its magnitude, may simply exceed financial resources at hand. In addition, multiple sources of risk may correlate with each other, thus raising the amount that a party must raise or reserve in order to be financially prepared. Wealth effects of all sorts are likely to complicate social responses to risk. Despite their reputation as "great social equalizers" that "strike unpredictably and at random," natural disasters inflict far disproportionate injury upon the socially and economically vulnerable. 30 Finally, certain hazards may lurk beyond the capacity of planners to project the true probability that those hazards may come to pass, let alone the expected value of the 31 total exposure at stake.
In somewhat different language, we might say that tort law defines due care as a straightforward exercise in cost-benefit analysis. whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
Insurance is a common and convenient arrangement for gathering the financial resources needed to take due care. Disaster policy, at its best, should identify the physical, fiscal, political, and epistemological points of stress that are most likely to undermine catastrophic preparedness. In light of the foregoing considerations, private insurance represents one of the first most important layers of financial preparedness for disaster. Losses that are at once catastrophic in magnitude and attributable to minute risks are best suited for insurers with the wealth and financial integrity to pool risks too great for most other actors to bear alone and to spread those risks across a broader financial base. 3 4 But many disasters pose special trouble even for the largest, most financially secure insurers. 35 Like their customers, insurance carriers have trouble evaluating the true likelihood of actuarially remote events. 3 6 Leptokurtic "probability distributions," more commonly known as fat-tailed distributions, "are inherently difficult to estimate. 3 7 When "events are rare," the sheer lag time between iterations often makes it "impossible to estimate just how quickly the tail tapers off." ' 38 Because "fat tails bring with them an epistemic problem,, 39 the law has failed to develop "a commonly accepted economic framework for dealing with ... thick-tailed extreme disasters., 40 In other words, the risks combining the lowest probability with the highest potential losses defy prediction under any statistical model. events virtually impossible to manage with any degree of ex ante confidence or competence. If a calamity is large enough, the sheer magnitude of the losses at stake will exceed the capacity of any single financial actor.
4 1 As a rule, "private insurers do not offer policies to cover water damage for hurricanes or actively promote earthquake coverage" because they fear both "the uncertainty of the risk and ... the severe financial cost of a catastrophic disaster" for which the insurance industry had extended "widespread coverage.", 42 Insurance against disasters is bedeviled by the same factors that cripple private insurance in every realm. In order to pool risks and pay claims profitably, insurers must be able to predict losses with accuracy. 43 The mere availability of insurance invites moral hazard in the sense that insured parties have an incentive at the margin, by virtue of the insurer's agreement to pay, to engage in risky behavior. 44 Moreover, adverse selection all but guarantees that an insurer must cover the worst risks within any market. 45 The countervailing tendency of insurers to "cherry-pick" low-risk clients raises a regulatory concern in its own right, that of inadequate coverage for individuals of modest means and political 46 power.
Correlation is perhaps the most insidious factor undermining the financial integrity of private insurance for catastrophic risk. The business of insurance ordinarily relies on the "law of large numbers" to manage "statistically independent risks," since an increase in "the number of insured persons possessing independent and identically valued risks" yields a corresponding improvement to the accuracy of predicting each individual insured's risk by "the reduction in the variance of risk of expected outcomes." 4 7 The ability of insurance pools to segregate high and low risk individuals likewise reduces the expected cost of insurance by further reducing variance in the 48 expected outcomes of the insured population as a whole.
By contrast, private insurers are extremely loath to cover risks that are highly correlated to each other. policies that purport to cover all risks.
In certain areas, an insurer asks not whether flooding will occur, but when. 5 3
The reluctance of private insurers to cover flood damage arises from the same financial instinct that counsels investors to diversify their portfolios by holding asset classes whose correlation, as measured by the r-squared statistic, is low. 54 Highly correlated catastrophic risks inflict "numerous losses ... simultaneously from a single event." 55 High correlation undermines the ability of insurance markets to rely on "risk aggregation, also known as the law of large numbers, which specifies that for a series of independent and identically distributed random variables, the variance of the average amount of the claim payment decreases as the number of claims increases." 56 Aggregating highly correlated risks would force insurers to perform the "unproductive" and unprofitable task of maintaining financial reserves that "would equal or, perhaps, exceed the reserves that individuals would have to maintain if uninsured. 57 Indeed, "[p]roviding coverage of highly correlated losses is exactly the opposite of the risk-reducing function of aggregation., 58 Underwriting policies for highly correlated losses such as flood damage thus inflicts a financial risk that most prudent insurers are unwilling to bear. 59 High levels of correlation among risks may signal a fundamental flaw in the statistical modeling of a particular hazard. Unexplored or unexplained connections among correlated risks may be the reason that statistical models fail so regularly to predict the actual probability and magnitude of tail risks. Contrary to our assumptions, these (negative) outcomes are emphatically not independent and identically distributed. The central limit theorem does not hold, and problems of correlation and covariance will bedevil efforts to predict risks and to prescribe responses.60 56. Id. at 92-93. 57. Priest, The Problem of Catastrophic Loss, supra note 17, at 222; see also id.
("Where risks are highly correlated, they cannot be effectively reduced by spreading them among those subject to the risk" (emphasis in original)). 42, at 65 (observing that reinsurers, rather than offering coverage "at an exorbitantly high premium," prefer instead to "indicate that they do not have enough capacity" to cover earthquakes and other natural disasters). Correlation within certain classes of losses, such as floods or crop loss, is so strong (as measured by r-squared or variants on that mathematical theme) that private insurers ordinarily refuse to underwrite those risks. The consideration of correlation by property and casualty insurers mirrors the treatment of correlation in the management of long asset portfolios, where r-squared and beta play vital roles in guiding investment decisions.
Id. at 226.

See
6 1 Indeed, beta, defined as the covariance between asset-specific and portfolio-wide returns,
* 62
divided by the variance of returns within the portfolio, is routinely treated as the simplest measure of systemic risk that cannot be managed by mere diversification. 6 3 This is the sense in which the P branch of mathematical finance, or portfolio theory, unites the worlds of investment, insurance, and disaster policy as distinct but related manifestations of risk management. 64 
III. CATASTROPHE BONDS AND THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVE RISK
TRANSFER
The emergence of a relatively new method of alternative risk transfer, the catastrophe bond, unites catastrophic risk management (1994) ; N. Smirnov, with other branches of finance and portfolio management. 65 Disaster law traverses a single continuum of methods for compensation and risk-spreading. 66 At the most practical level, catastrophe bonds and similar financial tools bridge the gap between conventional risk transfer (the traditional business of insurance and reinsurance) and innovative risk finance. 6 7 Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge earthquake of 1994 inflicted cataclysmic losses on insurers that had underwritten policies in areas affected by those disasters. The insurance industry responded to these financial meltdowns by seeking alternative ways to securitize its risks. 69 This quest for alternative methods for risk transfer culminated in the catastrophe bond. 70 (2006) (recognizing the value of "using probability distributions" to characterize and account for "uncertainties in inputs and outputs" in predictive models, as opposed to "'deterministic' assessment" based on specific "point estimates"). On methods for assessing risks to human health and/or the environment, see generally VINCENT T. COVELLO 71 Income derived from these investments "allows the industry to remain profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses." 72 In the aftermath of financially devastating events such as Andrew or the Northridge earthquake, the insurance industry may not recover more than half of the surplus it had accumulated from premiums collected before these disasters. 3 Catastrophe bonds transfer risks from the sponsoring insurer or reinsurer to investors willing to finance a contingent reserve in exchange for high returns on principal in the event the catastrophe never materializes. In turn, securitization through catastrophe bonds extends the financial resources of the insurance and reinsurance industries. 7 4 By harnessing the resources of the capital markets to provide capacity for selected property/casualty and life/health risks, catastrophe bonds "go beyond traditional forms of reinsurance. Like reinsurance or any other market mechanism available to the insurance industry, catastrophe bonds work best where highly MANAGEMENT To issue a catastrophe bond, an insurance company forms a special purpose reinsurance vehicle, typically underwritten by an investment bank chartered in an offshore jurisdiction (such as the Cayman Islands) known for relaxed financial regulation." Catastrophe bonds are typically structured as floating rate bonds whose principal is lost if specified trigger conditions are met. would then enable the insurer to honor claims arising from the disaster. 84 In an ideal circumstance, one in which a catastrophe bond's principal exceeds the issuer's liability for payments on a disaster, the forgiveness of the obligation to repay principal on a catastrophe bond allows the insurer to write down that liability and thereby realize an immediate increase in its net worth.
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This benefit to insurers reinforces investors' interest in catastrophe bonds' ability to deliver generous returns that do not correlate with conventional stocks and 86 bonds.
On the other hand, if the scale of a disaster exceeds the principal on a related catastrophe bond, the insurer and any reinsurers would face an all-too-familiar situation: falling short of the funds needed to satisfy claims arising from the disaster.
Whether catastrophe bonds will significantly enhance the ability of private insurers and reinsurers to manage catastrophic risk without governmental intervention depends on the ability of catastrophe bonds to outperform competing financial tools at the disposal of insurance and reinsurance carriers.
87
Studies by the Government Accountability Office suggest that transaction costs may consume as much as two percent of the insurance coverage provided by a catastrophe bond. 88 If these transaction costs are analogized to the expense ratio on financial instruments, they would align the managerial expense of catastrophe bonds with that of very expensive Closer examination undermines the premises on which this dire warning rests. As the above graphic shows, $19 billion catastrophe bonds was outstanding as of 2013. As large as this number may seem in absolute terms, it represents a relatively modest share of the overall property and casualty insurance market. The $19 billion catastrophe bond market "is a small fraction of the $300 billion in catastrophe-related payouts" for which insurers bear potential liability. 94 Catastrophe bonds comprise an even smaller share of net written premiums, estimated to run about $425 billion a year as of 2010. 95 These instruments have at most modest impact on a "global property and casualty insurance market According to Felix Salmon, "catastrophe bonds are the capitalmarkets security of the future, and they always will be.", 9 7 Salmon argues that two fundamentally different types of risk divide insurers from the investors they hope to invite into financial markets for indemnifying catastrophic risk. In as much as insurers and the insured want payouts defined according to losses, insurance markets operate on indemnity risk. 98 By contrast, would-be bondholders want payouts triggered by the "magnitude of earthquakes as measured by the modified Mercalli scale; hurricanes as measured by wind speed," and other indicia of parametric risk.
99
These are issues that can be addressed, at least at the margin, through improvements in the design of catastrophe bonds as financial instruments. Indemnity risk and parametric risk represent opposite ends of the spectrum of traditional triggers for catastrophe bond payouts, a range that also contemplates forgiveness of cat bond principal based on notional portfolio (modeled loss) or industry loss triggers. Parametric triggers are certainly most attractive to investors because of their lack of correlation to insurers' financial needs and resources. As Salmon argues, this very lack of correlation with actual indemnity payments is what repels insurance companies from the catastrophe bond market. proprietary catastrophe model in order to "estimat[e] their financial impact on the notional portfolio originally used to estimate the bond's risk., 1 0 2 An industry loss trigger is "based on actual losses to the insurance industry as a whole," usually based on the modeling agent's "own database of insured industry exposure to estimate the bond's probability of being triggered." Bond purchasers may also conduct their own "risk analysis of the sponsor's portfolio ... in order to estimate correlations between the sponsor and the industry's risk profile, and [to] select an industry loss trigger that will minimize basis risk."
Finally, a parametric trigger relies "on objective measurements, such as a hurricane's maximum wind speed and landfall location, or the ground motion measured by multiple seismometers after an earthquake. 10 3 Given the availability of other benchmarks, such as losses within a notional portfolio of insurance policies or losses across the entire property and casualty insurance industry, catastrophe bond triggers need not force a binary choice between perfectly correlated indemnity risk (which favors insurers) and optimally uncorrelated environmental parameters (which attract catastrophe bond investors). For instance, parametric index triggers seek to combine environmental parameters with industry loss metrics by using models that calculate approximate loss as a function of environmental parameters (such as wind speed at differing locations) and use those models to calculate the bond's payout function. 10 4
IV. PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN DISASTER INSURANCE MARKETS
A. The Samaritan's Dilemma. Avoiding Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks
The immaturity and modest size of emerging markets for catastrophe bonds and other forms of alternative risk transfer, coupled with enduring constraints on the capacity of private insurance markets, leave significant room for governmental 102 This is to say nothing of "cataclysmic, or globally undiversifiable" events -"events that are so severe that they may not be diversifiable even through securities markets. ' 1°6 Within the United States, the federal government has subsidized disaster insurance, directly underwritten policies that private insurers are unwilling to issue, or served as reinsurer of last resort. In many markets, government has pursued some combination of these strategies. Proper calibration of disaster law and policy demands an understanding of the pitfalls that await each of the flawed strategies available to governments.
Investments in disaster preparedness, or "important potential precautionary strategies that are designed to minimize the expected cost of or consequences associated with a natural disaster," exhibit "many of the characteristics of public goods., 1 0 7
Many of the precautionary measures that can be expected to blunt disaster's blow may "enjoy significant economies of scale, require the exercise of powers of eminent domain ... , and/or exhibit natural monopoly characteristics." 10 8 These economic traits describe "many ... forms of public infrastructure" and -increasingly so in a society guided by data-driven analytics -"the generation and provision of information relating to the underlying risks and expected costs of locating in vulnerable areas, weather forecasts of impending storms ... and so forth." ("In the most common view, the government is regarded as the most effective insurance instrument of the society, with increasing effectiveness as potential disasters increase in scale.
[T]he state can spread risks most broadly because it is the largest social entity in existence." earthquakes. 11 0 In harmony with these principles, Congress in 2012 directed the Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) to develop a protocol and database for allocating losses between water and wind in "named" storms. 111 In addition to directing FEMA to use the "most accurate data" in formulating flood maps in 100-year floodplains, 500-year floodplains, and "residual risk areas," Congress -in what may be its most significant move to improve the informational basis by which the federal government prepares for floods -has appropriated $400 million each year to fund FEMA's nationwide flood-mapping activities. 112 In so doing, Congress has finally fulfilled the tantalizing promise of the unenacted Natural Disaster Protection Act of 1993,113 which would have required FEMA to identify, on a peril-by-peril basis, which states were most at risk from hurricanes, floods, windstorms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions.'14
The case for public intervention in disaster finance is comparably strong. Like other forms of preparedness for disaster, insurance is "likely to be under-demanded and under-supplied" if catastrophic risk transfer is "left purely to private markets." ' 1 15 Indeed, the case for comprehensive disaster insurance, including public subsidies for types of coverage that private carriers find most unpalatable, was made half a century ago and remains mostly unrebutted on purely utilitarian grounds. 116 Yet financial preparedness for disaster, no less than physical and informational precautions, remains an "accident waiting to happen. ' ' 1 8 Like private financial actors, government is vulnerable to the effects of risk and uncertainty when it makes its own decisions to invest, whether in precaution or in infrastructure subject to catastrophic loss.
119 Whereas problems such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and -above all else -mismatches in statistical correlation cripple private insurance markets, the political economy of public disaster assistance destroys any coherent governmental approach to risk transfer.
12
Despite growing corporate awareness that private insurance coverage remains severely limited, the federal government -with the salient exception of the National Flood 123 (1999) (observing that "developing nations are less able to afford disaster detection technology and resilient construction practices," much as "stratification" along lines of "socioeconomic status, gender, and race or ethnicity" in the United States and other developed countries "results in an uneven distribution of exposure and vulnerability to hazards, disaster losses," and diminished "access to aid, recovery, and reconstruction").
118. Insurance Act of 1968121 and the concomitant establishment of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) -"has not intervened in insurance markets to enhance coverage available for victims of natural disaster. ' ' 122 As in so many other facets of disaster policy, the lack of financial preparedness for catastrophe arises from political failures to address market failures.
Government systematically underinvests in disaster preparedness ex ante and overinvests in disaster relief ex post.1 23 Even though precautionary investments ex ante may "reduce the risk and magnitude of damage from disasters" on a cost-effective basis, "the results are relatively more uncertain and less tangible" than dramatic, even heroic ex post measures such as " [VOL. XXVI Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 128 originally conceived as a limited stopgap for disasters exceeding local and state resources, into a quasi-entitlement of first rather than last resort.
129
Along every dimension -spatial, temporal, and behavioral -the political economy of disaster assistance dictates perverse outcomes. 13 In the logic and language of collective action, disaster relief presents a problem of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs.
13
Though local governments are all too eager to "allow development to occur where it should not" and to relax protective land use regulation, all in the name of enhanced property tax revenues, local governments willingly export "the costs of disaster... to the federal government. ' ,1 32 For its part, the federal government allocates more disaster expenditures in states whose representatives sit on congressional committees charged with overseeing FEMA.
33
Political cycles, alas, are shorter than the time horizons on which economically optimal disaster planning should take place. funding. 135 Roughly a quarter of federal disaster relief for farmers appears to be politically motivated. 136 As much as half of all federal disaster relief may be traceable to political rather than environmental or economic considerations. 137 Disaster relief epitomizes the practice of "fiat givings," whereby "the government declares -either expressly or by implication -that it will not permit... property to move, erode, or disappear." ' 138 In the politics of extreme natural events, it is a short path indeed from compassion to entitlement. 139 The politicization of disaster relief punishes not only the public fisc, but also the politicians themselves. Put simply, "disaster relief breeds public corruption., 140 The political economy of disaster relief often delivers sudden "windfalls" into stricken areas, and the political imperative to be perceived as proactive creates conditions "ripe for corruption and waste. 141 Ceteris paribus, politicians from disasterprone states are likelier to be indicted and convicted of corruption. 142 Behavioral constraints on human and institutional decisionmaking further pervert disaster policy. The endowment effect, a bedrock element of humans' innate heuristics for evaluating risk, 143 leads governments to overvalue pre-disaster wealth and to take economically unwarranted account of sunk costs. 144 It is politically impossible to refuse aid "once there are identified victims ... featured on the evening news. ''145 Indeed, disaster relief hinges on the timing of a disaster within the news cycle: the relative abundance or scarcity of other newsworthy events affects the magnitude of the aid that government grants to any particular disaster. 146 Neither economic wisdom nor constitutional restraint can withstand the political "imperative to respond to blameless suffering., 147 Salience, not sanity, dives the political economy of disaster law as a branch of prospect theory. 1992) (arguing that sunk costs, though "usually visible," nevertheless "should always be ignored when making economic decisions"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 7 (3d ed. 1986) (" [C] ost to an economist is a forward-looking concept"; costs already incurred "do not affect decisions on price and quantity."); PAUL A. SAMUELSON the sway of the gambler's fallacy 149 and "overinvest [s] in reconstruction in the wake of disaster based on a mistaken assumption that a period of repose and relative safety will follow." 15 In a manifestation of the availability heuristic, which hinges on the salience of data taken into account during decision-making, 151 the public may fall into a dangerous complacency after "a long period of calm," "as though... natural hazards no longer exist. ' The iron cross of public choice and behavioral economics subjects disaster law to a form of moral hazard unique to the formulation of governmental policies for compensation, recovery, and reconstruction after catastrophe. 1 57 So treacherous is the terrain that this special case of moral hazard deserves a name of its own: charity hazard.I18 Because people "typically are unaware of the hazards they face," they "rely heavily on emergency relief when the need arises." 159 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to declare that disaster victims rely on the provision of ex post relief. 160 Charity hazard poses a true Samaritan's dilemma: at the individual as well as the society level, post hoc disaster relief strongly breeds reliance on wealth transfers whose greatest inefficiency lies in their erosion of incentives to pursue optimal ex ante preparedness for disaster. the United States' most celebrated and comprehensive system of publicly subsidized disaster insurance, confirms these economic weaknesses in disaster law and policy. The NFIP was not originally designed to be actuarially sound. 163 The NFIP departed in two respects from the process by which a private insurer would set an actuarially fair premium. First, a private insurer would consider catastrophic as well as average loss years. Second, a private insurer would account for the cost of capital, including the cost of holding capital reserves required by insurance regulators.
16 5 Even worse, the NFIP appears to have engaged in no rigorous analysis at all in choosing the hundred-year "base flood" 166 as its actuarial baseline.
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Historically, the federal approach to flood insurance rested on the goal of keeping premiums low enough to keep property owners and insurers within the NFIP, without lowering premiums to the point of even more aggressively subsidizing high-risk behavior.1 68 In prescribing guidelines for NFIP premium rates, Congress was willing to accept rates that were either "adequate, on the basis of accepted actuarial principles, to provide reserves for anticipated losses" orin the case of rates "less than such" an actuarially sound "amount" -"consistent with the objective of making flood insurance available where necessary at reasonable rates so as to encourage prospective insureds to purchase such insurance." 1 6 9 The NFIP's discounts were neither means-tested nor otherwise targeted at lower-income to indicate the minimum level of flooding to be used by a community in its floodplain management regulations,"); id. § 59.1 (defining a "100-year flood" as a "flood having a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year"). For technical details on the computation of an exceedance probability such as the NFIP's 100-year "base flood" concept, see generally Grossi et al. The actual administration of the NFIP compounded the inefficiencies of the program's pricing policies. FEMA has consciously set flood insurance rates on a nationwide basis. This practice defeats any hope that premiums might reflect regional, local, and individualized "topographic factors that are relevant to flood risk. ' , 172 FEMA historically allowed "grandfathered properties" to keep lower premiums known to fall short of reflecting the actual risk of flooding and covering expected losses; worse still, the agency elected not to collect data on the full financial impact of grandfathering. 1 
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NFIP rates have never been set according to "market forces -which would tend to eliminate actuarially unsound rates -but by political forces and special interests. ' " 174 These flaws in the design of the NFIP compounded the unintended effect of risk management for flood-prone regions: although measures such as the construction of levees may reduce the probability of flooding, those steps invite further settlement in floodplains and thereby increase the magnitude of losses incurred during floods. regulations intended to mitigate flood loss"); Scales, supra note 50, at 12 ("NFIPbacked insurance was conceived as a way of inducing communities to adopt flood mitigation policies that the federal government ... could not compel.").
In what was almost certainly "the largest revamping of the flood ,,177 theaer insurance program since its origin in 1968, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Relief Act of 2012178 made considerable progress toward the elusive goal of placing the NFIP on actuarially sound footing. Put simply, Biggert-Waters "mark[s] the beginning of the end for NFIP's historically below-market insurance rates for flood insurance." '1 79 Prospectively, all new policies issued within the NFIP must insure homes according to "actuarial rates." 18 0 Biggert-Waters adopts an aggressive schedule for phasing out subsidized rates on flood insurance for second homes, business properties, and properties that have suffered multiple severe flood losses. Flood insurance premiums on these properties are to rise 25 percent per year until they reach "full actuarial cost." 181 The vast majority of homes currently insured under the NFIP are subject to an only modestly slower schedule (20 percent per year) that is designed to phase in actuarially accurate rates within five years.
182
If successful, the Biggert-Waters reform would address three of the NFIP's historical shortcomings: the failure to encourage widespread uptake of flood insurance, the failure to spur more prudent floodplain management, and the utter lack of long-run actuarial soundness. 183 The economic wisdom of the Biggert-Waters reform lies beyond serious dispute. A commitment to zero governmental relief provides a "unique optimum" solution for natural disasters, even where private expenditures to reduce risk are "not observable by insurance companies" and moral hazard reaches its apex. 184 The prevalence of exclusions, deductions, and coinsurance requirements, even in settings where private insurers have full control of underwriting, suggests that the reduction of moral hazard promises the ability to offer insurance to a broader swath of the population, at reduced cost for all participants.
185
Even where governmental intervention is warranted on grounds of efficiency, as in instances where "some individuals may incorrectly perceive the probability of loss," "[c]ompulsory government insurance" based on "actuarially fair premiums" would be superior to the dispensing of disaster relief on an ad hoc basis.
186 Financially sound disaster policy should strive to enable an actuarially sound system of "insurance [to] mimic any level of government relief' and thereby to reduce the degree to which "[g]overnment relief for risk distorts incentives because individuals no longer bear the full cost of their actions.
' " 1 87
Not surprisingly, politics has again undermined optimal disaster policy. As if to prove the political impossibility of achieving these economic goals, the immediate effect of the Biggert-Waters Act's provisions migrating NFIP premiums toward actuarially fair levels was to spur congressional retreat. In late 2013 and early 2014, both houses of Congress considered bills to retard the Biggert-Waters reform's timetable for achieving actuarial soundness, with an apparent eye toward eventual, outright repeal.188 As of July 2014, the Senate has passed its version of a would-be Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act. Once again, popular expectations that government will compensate victims for disaster-related losses drive the "self-fulfilling prophecy" that "citizens ... will prefer not to insure [catastrophic] Flood insurance and FEMA's administration of the NFIP illustrate merely one facet of the grander problem. National governments are often the only entities with sufficient size and power to serve as reinsurers at large for the global insurance industry. From a global perspective, only a few national governments have sufficient size and stability to serve that function. For a shifting variety of economic and political reasons, not all of those governments can or will provide a financial backstop for the global insurance and reinsurance industries.
Public subsidies for otherwise unprofitable lines of insurance represent just one possibility within disaster law's portfolio of tools for compensation and risk management. In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Congress entertained diverse proposals to subsidize or reform private disaster insurance. 191 As with flood insurance, Congress may elect to continue awarding federal subsidies. Properly managed, these subsidies may motivate private insurers and local governments to manage risks, particularly by directing insured parties to avoid or even to leave high-risk areas. Tax expenditures through exemptions, deductions, and credits 192 may enable taxpayers to recover tax credits against insurance premiums or to establish catastrophe savings accounts analogous to health savings accounts, "529" college savings accounts, and individual retirement accounts.
1 93 Private insurers might receive preferential tax treatment of contributions to financial reserves for catastrophic events. 9 Even more ambitiously, the federal government might interject itself as the ultimate reinsurer for catastrophic casualties and property loss. 195 In so doing, government as reinsurer would use its financial might to buttress an entire branch of the financial services industry, much as federal deposit insurance restored confidence in banking during the Great Depression. 196 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act established a program of this sort for insurance against terrorism. 197 As distasteful as public subsidization may seem, some alternatives manage to combine greater political controversy with more staggering potential for fiscal or even environmental damage. In the absence of effective incentives to buy subsidized federal crop insurance, 198 Worse still, because agriculture makes a significant contribution to climate change, the failure to reform crop insurance and other policies will promote monoculture and aggravate farming's negative ecological 202 footprint.
One alternative to ad hoc agricultural assistance or publicly subsidized crop insurance lies in index-based, parametrically triggered futures contracts that might stabilize agricultural finance in a way comparable to the impact of catastrophe bonds on financial preparedness for natural disasters. 2°3 By the admittedly abysmal standard of crop insurance and agricultural disaster assistance, government may find greater value in establishing comprehensive compensation schemes in advance. The 
V. THE EFFICIENT FRONTIER OF DISASTER FINANCE
From conventional tort litigation to catastrophe bonds, this survey demonstrates the conceptual unity of legal tools for compensating victims and spreading risk, whether through insurance, securitization, or public disaster assistance. Just as there is no such thing as a strictly natural disaster, there is no such thing as strictly private disaster law. The very existence of calamities beyond the capacity of ordinary citizens, companies, and institutions demands public intervention at every level. Far from being deviations from the presumed tasks of private law -the enforcement of primary rights and duties binding private citizens to each other 2 01 -taxation, subsidization, regulation, and public investment are tools of first resort in disaster law. The catastrophe bond specifically shows that disaster law's interplay of private actors and public governance operates in both directions. Conventional portrayals of risk management techniques in disaster law begin and end with public contributions to systems of compensation and insurance that the private sector cannot adequately manage on its own.
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Whatever their delivery vehicle, subsidies add 211 public dollars to private insurance markets.
Official involvement in catastrophic risk management inexorably thrusts government into the role of the ultimate reinsurer for all risks to property, life, and health. Catastrophe bonds illustrate the opposite effect. In all of its manifestations, alternative risk transfer promises the tantalizing possibility that private capital markets can infuse money from voluntary, profit-seeking participants into the project of managing catastrophic risk. 2 12 The practical exercise of evaluating tools for compensating disaster victims and spreading risk does more than apply disaster theory to existing legal tools and doctrines. This survey of risk management techniques in disaster law -from private insurance to public subsidies, with a tantalizing promise that private capital markets may yet enhance catastrophic preparedness -depicts disaster law as a comprehensive, theoretically coherent exercise in societal risk management.
The elusive pursuit of a fully diversified and theoretically coherent portfolio of financial tools for managing catastrophic risk shows how far disaster policy must still travel in order to reach the efficient frontier of legal preparedness for calamity.
212. See Bruggeman, supra note 67, at 10,140-4 1.
